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Abstract 
Driverless cars are a hot topic in today’s industry where several vehicle manufacturers 
try to create a reliable system for automated driving. The advantages of highly 
automated vehicles are many, safer roads and a lower environmental impact are some 
of the arguments for this technology. However, the notion of highly automated cars 
give rise to a large number of human factor issues regarding the safety and reliability 
of the automated system as well as concern about the driver’s role in the system. 
 
The purpose of this study was to explore the effects of systematic variations in 
traffic complexity and external time pressure on decision-making time in a 
simulated situation using a web-based testing platform. A secondary focus was 
to examine whether measures of cognitive performance and driver attitudes 
have an effect on decision-making time. 
 
The results show that systematic variations in both time pressure and traffic 
complexity have an effect on decision-making time. This indicates that drivers 
are able to adapt their decision-making to facilitate the requirements of a certain 
situation. The results also indicate that intelligence; speed of processing and 
driver attitudes has an effect on decision-making time.  
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1  Introduction 
Driverless cars are a hot topic in today’s industry where several vehicle manufacturers 
try to create a reliable system for automated driving. The advantages of highly 
automated vehicles are many, safer roads and a lower environmental impact are some 
of the arguments used for this technology. The Swedish car manufacturer Volvo in 
cooperation with the Swedish government just launched the Drive Me project whose 
aim is to deploy 100 highly automated cars in Gothenburg, Sweden by 2017 (Volvo 
Car Group, 2013). 
 
The notion of highly automated cars give rise to a large number of human factor 
issues regarding the safety and reliability of the automated system as well as concern 
about the driver’s role in the system. 
 
For instance, studies have shown that drivers in automated vehicles are likely to end 
up ‘out of the loop’, meaning they are excluded from the control-loop of the driving 
task and thereby losing situation awareness. It is also possible that drivers could 
experience a decline in driving skills (Onnasch, Wickens, Li & Manzey, 2014). In the 
best of cases the driver would serve as an automation supervisor and thereby maintain 
some level of situation awareness, although, the supervisor role may lead to loss of 
vigilance, or to the shrinkage of available cognitive resources (Young & Stanton, 
2002b) during long monotonous drives. Loss of vigilance may cause the driver to 
miss vital information about automation reliability (Norman, 2009 pp. 109, 114) as 
well as a loss in situation awareness.  
 
When automated systems reach a high level of automation, in which both the lateral 
and the longitudinal control loop are automated, it is likely that drivers can engage in 
different in-car activities unrelated to the driving task, such as, watching a film on a 
screen, doing work on their tablet or computer, reading a newspaper or whatever the 
driver feel like doing (De Winter, Happee, Martens & Stanton, In press). 
 
Situation awareness will most likely be adversely affected as driver attention is 
redirected from the road to other activities as shown in a meta-analysis of automated 
driving by De Winter et al. (in press). This in turn leads to increased response-times in 
comparison with manual driving in a situation where immediate attention is required 
as the driver actively has to gather information critical for the situation. This situation 
is very unlikely, however, there is no guarantee that an automated system will 
perform safely at all times. When automation failures arise it will most likely be with 
very short notice and without warning (Norman, 2013, pp. 213-214) hence, requiring 
a high driver vigilance state (Banks, Stanton & Harvey, 2014) or the driver would be 
likely to lose control of the situation and as a result, an accident could occur. This is 
an unlikely scenario as the automated system should be designed in a way that give 
the driver a heads up when the automation is approaching its operational boundaries, 
and thereby give the driver a chance to get back into the loop and make a safe transfer 
of control and avoid an accident (De Winter et al., In press). 
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1.1  Problem definition 
The problem with studying highly automated driving is that it is currently on a 
conceptual stage. This give rise to a number of issues when trying to introduce this 
concept to drivers, for example; what information is required to make safe transfers of 
control, how much time ahead does a driver need before a transfer of control can be 
made safely and how much time does a driver need to be able to orient him-/her-self 
in a situation where a transfer of control might be necessary. Given that the 
technology is quite far from being commercially available there is a lack of 
experience when it comes to highly automated driving.  
 
In order to address these questions, a simple tool is needed to help examine the 
information needs in a highly automated vehicle. It is also important to try and discern 
in what time frame drivers can evaluate a situation in order to make a decision or 
initiate a transfer of control.  
 
 
1.2  Purpose 
The main focus of this thesis is to find out whether and how different levels of time 
constraints and traffic complexity used in the study have an effect on the time it takes 
to evaluate the situation presented and make a decision (henceforth referred to as 
decision-making time) to ensure that the manipulations have an effect. The secondary 
area of focus is examine how and if measures of cognitive performance, 
demographical data and a measure of driver attitudes can account for any variance in 
decision-making time.  
1.3  Research Questions 
  Are there any systematic differences in decision-making time between: 
o  Different traffic complexity conditions?  
o  Different time constraints? 
  What factors could serve as predictors of decision-making time? 
o  Are there any cognitive abilities that can serve as predictors of 
decision-making time? 
1.4  Delimitations 
The scope of this study is delimited to examine how decision-making time is affected 
by time constraint and traffic complexity as well as how well decision-making time 
can be predicted by the cognitive tests. The actual decisions the drivers made will not 
be included in this study as the time frame does not allow for such an extensive 
analysis to be made. 
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2  Theoretical background 
Relevant background theories for the study are presented in the sub-chapters below. 
2.1  Malleable Attentional Resources Theory 
The Malleable Attentional Resources Theory (MART) is an attentional resources 
theory suggested by Young and Stanton (2002a) as a way of explaining how 
attentional resources expand and shrink in relation to mental workload (MWL). This 
would mean that the attentional resources increase as MWL increases in complex, 
high workload situations (until a maximum level is reached) and the opposite would 
occur when in situations with low complexity and workload as the theory postulates 
that the attentional resources would shrink in relation to workload.  
 
For example, according to the theory the attentional resources of the driver would 
shrink when driving in a highly automated vehicle due to a decrease in MWL caused 
by the lack of effort in performing the task. This would mean that the driver could 
suffer from mental underload (Young & Stanton, 2002b), meaning that the driver 
would have difficulties taking control of the vehicle if an emergency transfer of 
control would be necessary, as the driver has insufficient resources allocated to cope 
with the difficulty of the task. The implications of this ‘underload’ would, according 
to the authors (Young & Stanton, 2002a; Young & Stanton, 2002b) be equally bad, if 
not worse, than the more familiar concept of mental overload occurring in high 
workload conditions (Wickens, 2008). However, if the driver were preoccupied with a 
challenging task when in an automated vehicle, he would, in theory, have enough 
attentional resources allocated to safely handle a transfer of control if a sudden 
automation failure would occur. 
 
2.2  Decision-making 
The following sections contain theoretical background of decision-making, in relation 
to cognitive abilities, relevant for the subsequent sub-chapters. 
2.2.1  Decisions and risk 
According to Kahneman and Tversky (1979) people underweigh outcomes that are 
probable in comparison with outcomes that are certain. This is called the certainty 
effect, which means that people generally avoid taking decisions resulting in 
uncertainty when there is an option resulting in a guaranteed gain and that people take 
decisions where the outcome is uncertain when the other option results in a 
guaranteed loss (Rabin & Weizäcker, 2007). People also seem to discard components 
of a decision, which is shared amongst the different options. This is called the 
isolation effect, which causes inconsistency in decision-making preferences when the 
same choice is presented in different forms. (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1981) 
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2.2.2  Choice bracketing 
In a decision-making situation the decision maker can either “broadly bracket” or 
“narrowly bracket” their decision space. Broad bracketing essentially means that the 
decision maker takes all the available decisions in to account, weighing them against 
each other to make the best decision given the available alternatives. The opposite 
stands for a narrow bracketer, a decision maker that uses narrow bracketing only 
considers the available options on their own. Hence, there is no comparison between 
available options. Consider the following example: A trivial decision such as having a 
cigarette would satisfy a person employing a narrow bracketing strategy because they 
only consider the sort term pleasure of having a cigarette rather than to look at the 
long term effects of smoking. Whereas a broad bracketer would choose not to smoke 
because of the long-term effects caused by smoking. (Read, Loewenstein & Rabin, 
1999; Rabin & Weizäcker 2007) 
 
2.2.3  Choice bracketing in relation to cognitive ability 
According to Dohmen, Falk, Huffman & Sunde (2010) there is a correlation between 
cognitive ability and risk aversion where willingness to take risks correlate with high 
cognitive ability. In relation to the decision bracketing theories by Read, Loewenstein 
& Rabin (1999) and Rabin & Weizäcker (2007) people with higher cognitive ability 
would, in theory, be prone to take risky decisions in the same manner as a broad 
bracketer would and hence, the decision maker should consider all available options 
and picking the one with the largest gain even though there is a risk that the choice 
will result in an unfavourable outcome. In theory it would also mean that people with 
low cognitive ability are more risk averse and will avoid taking decisions, which 
could result in an unfavourable outcome.  
 
As well as correlating cognitive ability with risk averse behaviour Dohmen et al. 
(2010) found a correlation between patience and cognitive ability which indicates that 
people with high cognitive ability are more patient than people with low cognitive 
ability. This claim is also supported by Shane Fredrick’s (2005) research on decision-
making and cognitive reflection, stating that people with higher cognitive ability (or 
IQ) are able to supress the response that first comes to mind and instead take more 
background factors into account before making a decision, weighing the advantages 
against disadvantages to take a favourable decision. In terms of decision-making this 
could indicate that people with high cognitive ability are willing to take long-term 
risky decisions such as investing in stocks. This could also, in theory mean that the 
time to make a decision would be higher in people with high cognitive ability than in 
people with lower cognitive ability as they spend more time weighing each option 
against the desired outcome.  
 
Dohmen et al. (2010) suggests a simple way of testing an individual’s cognitive 
ability, which correlates with risk averse behaviour as well as patience. The test 
suggested is called a symbol-number correspondence test, the test have been 
controlled for personal characteristics, educational attainment, income and liquidity 
constraints as well as additional robustness checks which, according to the authors, 
makes the symbol-number correspondence test a reliable way of testing cognitive 
ability. The test itself is described in detail in chapter 2.4 below. 
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2.3  Trail-Making Test B 
The Trail-Making Test B, henceforth referred to as TMT-B, is a widely used 
cognitive test to assess neurological impairment and brain damage. In the test the 
participant must connect 26 circles with alternating numbers and letters (i.e. 1-A, 2-B 
etc.). The test is scored on the time to complete the task (Oliveira-Souza et. al., 2000; 
Tombaugh, 2003; Betz & Fisher, 2009) and is sensitive on the following cognitive 
abilities: visual search, scanning, speed of processing, a visouspatial sequencing 
factor, cognitive set shifting, executive functioning and working memory (Oliveira-
Souza et. al., 2000; Aributhnott & Frank, 2000; Tombaugh, 2003; Betz & Fisher, 
2009; Salthouse, 2011; Sánchez-Coubillo, In press).  
 
Oliveira-Souza et al. (2000) suggest that TMT-B performance could serve as a 
predictor of whether people are able to quickly adjust their behaviour depending on 
environmental changes. This could, in theory, serve as a tool to predict performance 
in automated driving i.e. where the driver goes from a sleeping state to a woken state 
where he/she is expected to take over control within a reasonable amount of time. 
This in combination with the fact that TMT-B seem to relate to a multitude of 
cognitive functions (mentioned earlier) it should be able to explain some of the 
variance between participants in the information preferences test. 
 
2.4  Symbol-number Correspondence task 
The Symbol-Number Correspondence (SNCT) task is a multifaceted cognitive test 
widely used in disability research. The multifaceted characteristics of the SNCT is 
both an asset as well as a failing since the score on the test is dependent on several 
factors that correlates highly with overall test performance, such factors are speed of 
processing and memory (Joy, Kaplan & Fein, 2004). Both Joy et al. (2004) and 
Crowe et al. (1998) showed that speed of processing could explain 50% of the 
variance in performance of the SNCT and that memory has a secondary role in 
performance as it only explains 5-7% or 14-15% of the variance depending on which 
test is used to assess the memory component (using either the incidental learning tests 
or the WMS-II indexes). Crowe et al. (1998) also showed that motor execution speed 
was able to predict a significant amount of variance in the SNCT. This should mean 
that there are more factors influencing the performance of the task, which should be 
taken in to consideration when using the task to assess speed of processing.  
 
2.5  Tower of Hanoi 
The Tower of Hanoi (TOH) is a “look ahead puzzle” in which a participant has to 
move a set of three discs from one “peg” to another utilizing a third peg in 
between the starting peg and the goal peg in as few moves as possible. Only one 
disc can be moved at a time and the participant can only place a smaller disc on 
top of a larger one. The difficulty in this task lies in breaking down the task in to 
sub task and solve these sub goals individually, which requires good planning 
skills (Shallice, 1982). The TOH is believed to assess some specific executive 
functions including planning, working memory, checking, monitoring and 
revising (Welsh, Satterlee-Cartmell & Stine, 1999). This also entails the ability to 
allocate cognitive resources to solve problems (Kafer & Hunter, 1997).  
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2.6  Driver Behaviour Questionnaire 
The Driver Behaviour Questionnaire (DBQ) was originally developed by James 
Reason (1990) to be able to collect self-reported data from drivers when objective 
records of driving behaviour and traffic violations were unavailable. The original 
scale consists of 50 items and serves to give a score on the following three underlying 
factors: errors, violations and lapses. A meta-analysis of the DBQ by De Winter and 
Dodou (2010) showed that the original DBQ (Reason, 1990) or different modified 
versions (see Parker, Reason, Manstead & Stradling, 1995; Wells, Tong, Sexton, 
Grayson & Jones, 2008; Martinussen, Lajunen, Møller & Özkan, 2013; De Winter, 
2013) of the DBQ have been used in 174 studies since its introduction. The study 
showed that the DBQ errors and violations factors are significant predictors of self 
reported accidents (De Winter & Dudo, 2010).  
 
The DBQ used in this study is a modified shorter version of the DBQ by Wells et al 
(2008) created by De Winter (2013). The DBQ questions 1-7 were chosen as they, 
according to an exploratory factor analysis by De Winter (2013), loaded highly on the 
violations factor, the questions 8-10 were chosen as they loaded highly on the error 
factor and the questions 11-12 were chosen to capture lateral driving behaviour.   
 
DBQ Questions 
1  Sound your horn to indicate your annoyance with another road user 
2  Disregard the speed limit on a residential road 
3  Use a mobile phone without a hands free kit 
4  Become angered by a particular type of driver, and indicate your hostility by whatever 
means you can 
5  Race away from traffic lights with the intention of beating the driver next to you 
6  Drive so close to the car in front that it would be difficult to stop in an emergency 
7  Disregard the speed limit on a motorway 
8  Change into the wrong gear 
9  Forget to take the handbrake off before moving off 
10  Get into the wrong lane when approaching a roundabout or junction 
11  Incorrect steering so that you hit the curb 
12  Strayed from the middle of the lane into the verge or emergency lane 
Table 1: DBQ questions from De Winter (2013) 
The DBQ has no formal scoring system (De Winter et. al, in press) and the factors of 
the different DBQ’s are often assessed using a Principal Components analysis made 
by the researchers (De Winter, in press). This is not needed for this study as this study 
utilizes a DBQ version that is already assessed. The DBQ will be scored based on the 
mean score of the questions within each factor as well as an overall mean score. 
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3  Method 
The test battery used in this experiment was divided into six parts, 3 cognitive tests, 2 
questionnaires and the information preferences test. The different cognitive tests are 
described through chapters 2.3 to 2.5, the DBQ questionnaire are described in detail 
in chapter 2.6. Following these tests is an information preferences test devised and 
developed for the sake of this experiment. An illustration of the test structure is shown 
in Figure 1and the test design is described in detail in the paragraphs following 
Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1: The structure and order of the test battery 
3.1  Test description 
The information preferences interface has three main parts, the case image area 
(1), the information area (2) and the information selection area (3). A brief 
scenario text is displayed before starting each visual scenario (I.e. after a while 
without driving manually you feel like taking over the control of your car, what 
information do you need? The time for this task is limited to:  30 seconds). The 
participant continues to the visual scenario by pressing a button on the screen 
with the written scenario description. By pressing the button the participant 
moves to a visual scenario where an image was displayed along with different 
information types visible at the bottom of Figure 2. The participant then selects, 
via a click on the mouse, the information he/she prefers based (in theory) on the 
image displayed and the current time constraint. The information is displayed in 
the rightmost window (the turn by turn navigation in Figure 2).  
 
When the participant is satisfied with his/her choices he/she may press the 
continue button to move to the next scenario information screen. If the 
participant does not click the continue button he/she will be transferred to the 
next scenario information screen when the time limit of the scenario is reached 
(15, 30 or 120-seconds). The measures collected from the information 
preferences task are: 
  Time to first decision (which could be seen as a form of reaction time),  
  First decision. 
  The time the first decision window is open (i.e. the time it takes to 
register the information accessed and continue to the next scenario or 
choose a new set of information). 
  What the second decision is and  
  The time spent viewing the information of that particular information 
category.  
 
 
 
Demographic 
questionnaire
Tower of 
Hanoi
Symbol Number 
Correspondence 
task
Trail Making 
Test-B
Driver 
Behaviour 
Questionnaire
Information 
Preferences 
test14 
 
Figure 2: The information preferences main screen (scenario image removed du to copyright 
reasons) 
3.1.1  Procedure 
 
1.  The test started with a screen informing the participant of the test as well as 
informing them about what the data was supposed to be used for. The 
information given is available in Appendix 1. They were then told that they 
are giving consent to the use of the data generated by their participation in the 
test by continuing to the actual test by pressing a “start test” button. The test 
then proceeds to a demographic questionnaire with questions regarding age, 
country, educational level, socioeconomical status, drivers license and annual 
mileage. 
 
2.  After completion of the demographic questionnaire the participant moved on 
to the first cognitive test in a series of three, The Tower of Hanoi, which is 
illustrated in Figure 3 and described in detail in chapter 2.5. The participant 
was given instructions about the test rules as well as the goal of the task before 
commencing to the actual test. The TOH task used in this was the three-disc 
version where the optimal solution requires 7 steps.  
   
1 
3 
2 15 
The participant’s performance was assessed based on the total number of 
moves required to reach a solution as well as the time it took to complete the 
task. Data on the number of false moves (i.e. when the participant tried to 
place a larger disc on top of a smaller disc) were also collected as to be able to 
discern whether the participant had understood the limitations in the task. 
 
Figure 3: The Tower of Hanoi test screen 
 
3.  The second cognitive test was the SNCT illustrated in Figure 4 and Figure 5 
and described in detail in chapter 2.4. The participant received instructions 
about the task and the 90-second time constraint and that he/she would have a 
chance to see the all numbers and their corresponding symbols before the test 
with an unlimited time to memorize the symbol/number correspondences. The 
participant was also informed that the symbol/number correspondences would 
be visible throughout the test.  
 
In the SNCT the participant had to enter the digit that corresponded to the 
symbol shown on the screen as fast as possible, when the interface registered a 
keystroke it immediately presented a new stimulus, saved the time between 
stimulus presentation and response and if the response was correct or not. The 
performance measures collected for this task were the average stimulus 
response time in milliseconds, the total number of responses, the number of 
correct responses as well as more detailed information in the form of the time 
in milliseconds for each individual stimuli response and whether the response 
was correct or not.  16 
 
 
 
Figure 4: The symbol number correspondences displayed before the Symbol Number 
Correspondence Task 
 
 
 
Figure 5: The Symbol Number Correspondence Task test screen. Symbol number associations at the 
top of the screen and the current symbol in the middle of the screen with an input field to the right. 
 
4.  The third cognitive test is the TMT-B, which is illustrated in Figure 6 and 
described in detail in chapter 2.3. In the TMT-B test the participant was 
supposed to work his/her way through a set of 26 circles in a set order based 
on the contents of the circle. Thirteen of the circles were numbered from 1-13 
and the other thirteen had the letters A-M in them. The participant was 
instructed to click the circles in the following order: 1-A, 2-B, 3-C etc. The 
participant was also informed that the focus of the task was to complete it 
without making any errors, and that the first and last circle would be 
highlighted to make it easier for the participant to identify both the start and 
the end of the task. The data collected in this task were the total time of the 
task as well as the number of correct inputs and average time/input. 17 
 
 
Figure 6: The Trail Making Test-B test screen. 
 
5.  After the TMT-B the participant was asked to fill out the second 
questionnaire, the DBQ. A detailed description of the DBQ can be found in 
chapter 2.6 
 
6.  The last part of the experiment was the information preferences test, which 
was designed as a tool to find out what information the participants preferred 
in certain situations. The information preferences test is subdivided into one 
training phase and one test phase.  
 
a.  The training phase consisted of 4 sub tasks where the two first tasks were 
without time constraint and the second two had the same time constraints 
used in the time limited sub-tasks of the main test as to make sure that the 
participants had a chance to familiarize themselves with the general layout 
and functions of the user interface in this test. The participants were 
instructed to take their time to familiarize themselves with the user 
interface before moving on to the main phase of the test as to make sure 
that confounding variables such as unfamiliarity with the interface etc. did 
not contribute to the variance in the data recorded in the main phase. 
 
b.  The main test phase consists of 9 sub tasks with different conditions 
generally described in Table 2; the exact time constraints are specified in 
chapter 3.2.4 for the pilot and main experiment. The order of stimuli was 
balanced using a randomization function to minimize the impact of order 
effects. 
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Task  Time limit  Traffic complexity 
1  Short time limit  Low complexity 
2  Medium time limit  Medium complexity 
3  No time limit  High complexity 
4  Short time limit  Medium complexity 
5  Medium time limit  High complexity 
6  No time limit  Low complexity 
7  Short time limit  High complexity 
8  Medium time limit  Low complexity 
9  No time limit  Medium complexity 
Table 2: Experimental conditions for the information preferences test 
The experiment used a 3x3 design where all participants were presented 
with 9 different stimuli combining the 3 time conditions and the 3 
complexity conditions. The different time related experimental 
manipulations in the sub tasks consisted of high vs. low time pressure to see 
whether time pressure had an effect on the information prioritization of the 
drivers. The no time pressure condition was used as a control to make sure 
the differences were due to time pressure and not caused by unknown 
confounding factors.  
 
The different complexity related conditions consists of 3 levels of traffic 
complexity where high complexity was a situation where there were a lot of 
vehicles and signs. Medium complexity was where the traffic situation was 
somewhat less complex than in the high complexity condition with fewer 
cars and more headway. The low complexity condition had almost no 
traffic and a lot of headway. The low complexity condition served as a 
baseline condition as possible distractions were kept at a minimum.  
 
3.1.2  Technical limitations 
All tests were developed for online use and was written in the following programming 
languages; PHP, JavaScript and HTML5 to facilitate smooth user interaction and an 
easy data collection process as the participants were free to use any computer with a 
high enough resolution (the resolution was limited to 1024x768 to make sure that no 
parts of the test disappeared outside of the screen area).  
 
The use of mobile devices were considered but discarded as these users have an 
advantage over participants using regular means of computer interaction such as 
trackpad and mouse. An example of this advantage would be in the TMT-B test as the 
user of a touch screen enabled mobile device may be able to interact with the test in a 
smoother and faster way in comparison with a regular user.   
 
By the use of a small script to detect mobile devices and screen resolution we were 
able to make sure users with low resolution screens or mobile devices were not able to 
participate in the test, these users were instead redirected to a dedicated error page 
stating the nature of the problem and encouraging the use of a regular computer or a 
computer with a higher resolution.  
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3.2  Pilot test 
The following sub-chapter contains the design, procedure and results of the pilot 
test. 
3.2.1  Purpose 
The main purpose of the pilot study was to find adequate time restrictions for 
the time limits to be used in the main study. The reason for this is that it gives 
the larger study some increase in validity, as the time restriction is not an 
arbitrarily chosen number but based on actual data collected from a smaller 
sample prior to the larger study. 
 
The times used in the larger study was based on the 80th percentile of the time 
spent before the participants ran out of time and were automatically transferred 
to the next sub-task or when the participants chose to move to the next sub task 
using the continue button. 
3.2.2  Test description 
The cognitive tests and the DBQ was excluded from the pilot study since the 
main objective of the pilot study was to find a suitable time restriction for the 
information preferences task, hence, the pilot study only contain the 
demographic questionnaire and the complete information preferences including 
the short training session. The time restrictions displayed in Table 3 for the pilot 
were chosen arbitrarily based on what the research team found plausible after a 
couple of inofficial trials. 
 
Task  Time limit  Traffic complexity 
1  15-seconds  Low complexity 
2  30-seconds  Medium complexity 
3  120-seconds  High complexity 
4  15-seconds  Medium complexity 
5  30-seconds  High complexity 
6  120-seconds  Low complexity 
7  15-seconds  High complexity 
8  30-seconds  Low complexity 
9  120-seconds  Medium complexity 
Table 3: The different time constraints used for the pilot and main study 
3.2.3  Participants 
A small sample of 7 participants was collected for the sake of the pilot study. In 
the sample there were 5 males and 2 females. 
3.2.4  Results 
The time to the participants’ first decision for each task was divided into the 
separate time constraint levels and the 80th percentile was extracted from each 
condition. The result from this analysis is displayed in Table 4 
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Constraint 
Actual Time 
(in seconds)  N 
Average:       
  15-seconds  13.73  21 
  30-seconds  18.32  21 
  120-seconds  17.81  21 
  All groups  16.62  63 
80th percentile:       
  15-seconds  15.00  21 
  30-seconds  29.97  21 
  120-seconds  23.22  21 
  All groups  22.74  63 
Table 4: Mean- and 80th percentile values of time spent to decision for the different time constraints 
The results from the pilot indicate that the arbitrarily chosen times for the pilot 
were a good approximation for the actual time spent completing the task, hence 
these time constraints were kept on the same levels for the main study; the 120-
second time constraint was kept at the same level as the purpose of the higher 
constraint is to give participants enough time to decide and then move to the 
next task on their own without getting stuck. 
 
3.3  Main study 
The following sub-chapters contain demographical data of the participants in 
this study. 
3.3.1  Participants 
The aim was to recruit as many participants as possible within a relatively short 
time frame. A total of 116 participants were recruited using the social network 
Facebook and more traditional means such as E-mailing lists. Eighty-one 
participants remained after removal of participants based on missing values and 
partial dropouts.  The participants were between 19-71 years old with an annual 
mileage between 0-50 000 kilometres (mean, standard deviation and range is 
shown in Table 5).  For detail demographical information see Table 6. 
 
 
Mean  SD  Min  Max 
Age  28.56  10.94  19  71 
Annual mileage (Km)  5377.75  9802.91  0  50000 
Annual income (SEK)  190406.45  185130.39  0  765000 
Table 5: Descriptive statistics of Age, annual mileage in kilometres and annual income of the sample 
used 
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N   
Male  49   
Female  32   
Car License  72   
Bus License  1   
Motorcycle License  5   
Truck license  4   
High School  5   
College  12   
University  60   
Post-graduate  3   
Table 6: Sample distribution over a set of demographic factors 
In this study the data were analysed on an aggregated level meaning that there 
are no splits, other than by sex, based on the demographic data. 
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4  Analysis 
All analyses in this study were carried out using IBM SPSS 22. A significance level 
of α = 0.1 was used for all tests as this study was of an exploratory character. 
However, if the p-value was below .05 it was marked as p < .05. 
A bifactorial analysis of variance was carried out to assess whether there was a 
difference in decision-making time between the factors time constraint and 
traffic complexity. All post-hoc tests and pairwise comparisons were corrected 
for multiple testing using the Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons. 
 
A multiple linear regression was used to analyse the linear relationships 
between decision-making time and the other collected variables. The regression 
analysis used forced entry to enter the variables of interest in to the regression. 
The resulting model shows the predictors remaining after removal of 
insignificant predictors.  
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5  Results 
The following sub-chapters contain the results from the bifactorial ANOVA and 
the regression used to evaluate the research questions proposed in this study. 
 
5.1.1  Differences in decision time 
A bifactorial ANOVA showed significant main effects between the different time 
constraints F(2, 720) = 13.91 p<.05 η2 = 0.037, observed power = .999 and the 
different traffic complexity levels F(2, 720) = 7.97, p<.05, η2 = .022, observed 
power = .978.  The means of each main effect is illustrated in Figure 7 and Figure 
8. 
 
Post-hoc tests for the effect of time constraint on the time to first decision is 
shown in Table 7 and for the effect of traffic complexity on the time to first 
decision is shown in Table 8. 
 
5.1.1.1  Main effect of Time constraint 
Time 
constraint 
 
15-second  30-second  120-second 
Mean ± SD 
 
5703.83 ± 4112.95  7840.66 ± 5034.30  7767.64 ± 5243.94 
Post-hoc 
  30-second  p=.000* 
   
 
120-second  p = .000*  p=.986 
  Table 7: Mean values and post-hoc tests of the main effect of time constraint in the time to decision 
variable. Significant values are marked by an asterix 
 
 
   
Figure 7: Mean values of the time to decision variable in the different time constraints 
   
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
8000
9000
15 seconds 30 seconds 120 seconds
M
i
l
l
i
s
e
c
o
n
d
s
Time constraint
Decision making time (ms)24 
5.1.1.2  Main effect of Traffic complexity 
Traffic 
complexity 
 
High  Medium  Low 
Mean ± SD 
 
7263.10 ± 5143.39  7932.00 ± 5761.83  6117.00 ± 4621.73 
Post-hoc  
  Medium  p=.439 
   
 
Low  p = .039*  p=.000* 
  Table 8: Mean values and post-hoc tests of the main effect of Traffic complexity in the time to 
decision variable. Significant values are marked by an asterix 
 
The post-hoc comparisons on the main effect of traffic complexity on decision-
making time in Table 8 indicate that the time to decide increases as the 
complexity increases from low complexity to medium complexity, although there 
is no difference between the high and medium traffic complexity condition.  
 
 
Figure 8: Mean values of the time to decision variable in the traffic complexity conditions. 
 
There was a significant simple effect of time constraint within the high traffic 
complexity condition F(2, 720) = 9.08, p < .05  η2 = .022, observed power = .979 and 
the medium traffic complexity condition F(2, 720) = 11.40, p < .05 η2 = .031, 
observed power = .997. Pairwise comparisons are shown in Table 9.  
 
High complexity  15-seconds  30-seconds  120-seconds 
 
Mean ± SD  5677.23 ± 3170.36  7232.32 ± 4445.48  8879.72 ± 6709.52 
 
30-seconds  p=.154 
   
 
120-seconds  p=.000*  p=.117 
  Medium complexity 
     
 
Mean ± SD  6190.42 ± 5639.79  9962.46 ± 5648.62  7643.21 ± 5420.50 
 
30-seconds  p=.000* 
   
 
120-seconds  p=.206  p=.011* 
  Table 9: Pairwise comparisons of the different conditions in the simple main effect of time 
constraint 
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There was also a significant simple effect of traffic complexity within the 30-
second time constraint F(2, 720) = 11.29, p < .05, η2 = .03, observed power = .997 
and the “no time constraint” condition F(2, 720) = 3.51, p < .05, η2 = .01, observed 
power = .763. Pairwise comparisons are shown in Table 10. 
 
   
Low complexity 
Medium 
Complexity 
High 
Complexity 
30-seconds 
Mean ± SD 
 
6327.21 ± 
4212.46 
9962.46 ± 
5648.62 
7232.32 ± 
4445.48 
 
Medium 
complexity  p=.002* 
   
 
High 
Complexity  p=.769  p=.000* 
 
120-seconds 
Mean ± SD 
 
6780.00 ± 
6066.78 
7643.21 ± 
5420.51 
8879.72 ± 
6709.52 
 
Medium 
Complexity  p=.363 
   
 
High 
Complexity  p=.026*  p=.837 
  Table 10: Pairwise comparisons of the different conditions in the simple main effect of traffic 
complexity 
There was also a significant interaction between the time constraint and the 
traffic complexity of the image, F(4,720) = 3.769, p < .05, η2 = .021, observed 
power = .939. This effect indicates that the decision-making time was affected 
differently by the traffic complexity within the different time constraints (see Figure 
9). Specifically, the decision-making time was significantly higher in the 120-second 
time constraint than in the 30-second time constraint (30-second, M = 7232 SD = 
4445.48; 120-second, M = 8879, SD = 6709.52) in the high traffic complexity 
condition. The decision-making time was significantly higher in the 120-second time 
constraint than in the 30-second time constraint (30-second, M = 7327.21, SD = 
4112.96; 120-second, M = 6780, SD = 4623.70) for the low traffic complexity 
condition.  
 
In the 120-second time constraint there is a significant increase in decision-
making time between the high complexity condition and the low complexity 
condition.  Looking at the mean values of the different complexities there is an 
increase in decision-making time as the complexity increases. 26 
 
Figure 9: Interaction effect between the 30 and 120-second time constraint in the high and low 
complexity conditions 
5.1.2  Predictors of decision-making time 
 
A multiple linear regression analysis was made to assess what measures could 
serve as predictors of decision-making time. The initial predictors used for the 
regression are presented in Table 11. The regression resulted in a significant 
model able to predict ~11% of the variance in decision-making time (R2  = 0.109, 
F(10, 719) = 8.911, p < .05). A new model was then constructed using only the 
variables that were significant predictors of the variance. The second regression 
resulted in an improved model that could predict ~11% of the variance in 
decision-making time R2  = 0.109, F(7, 712) = 12.390, p < .05.  Significant model 
predictors are displayed in Table 11. 
 
 
 
B  Std. Error  β  t  p 
Constant  4959.54  1351.16  -  3.671  p=.000** 
Age  50.68  18.97  0.106  2.671  p=.008** 
DBQ Errors  423.68  222.87  0.089  1.9  p=.058* 
DBQ Violations  -449.47  218.97  -0.096  -2.05  p=.04** 
SNCT correct  -57.49  18.61  -0.121  -3.08  p=.002** 
Tmt time  .01  .007  .060  1.5  p=.134 
Toh moves  -7.9  38.87  -.012  .203  p=.839 
Toh time  .003  .006  .026  .431  p=.667 
Educational level  1355.11  305.93  0.16  4.43  p=.000** 
Traffic complexity  -603.84  226.87  -0.094  -2.66  p=.008** 
Time constraint  1012.1  226.87  0.158  4.461  p=.000** 
Table 11: Predictors of the time to decision variable. Significant values at the p < 0.1 level are 
marked with one asterix (*), significant values at the p < 0.05 level are marked with two asterixes 
(**). Unsignificant predictors entered in the original model are greyed out. 
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6  Discussion 
The results and methodology is discussed in the following sub-chapters. 
6.1  Results 
 
Are there any systematic differences in decision-making time between: 
  Different traffic complexity conditions?  
  Different time constraints? 
 
The results from the factorial ANOVA reliably (observed power of each effect 
exceeds .9) indicate that both time and traffic complexity on their own and in 
interaction had a significant effect on decision-making time. 
 
It is clear that participants make faster decisions when under pressure in the 
high time constraint condition whereas there is no difference in decision making 
time between the medium and the no time constraint condition. This could mean 
that people make their decisions faster when under pressure but when the time 
constraint is above a certain level they spend equal time to make the decision, as 
they would have if they were not subject to any time pressure.  
 
Similarly, complexity does not seem to have a linear, but rather a threshold 
effect. It looks like the traffic complexity affects decision-making time in 
situations where the complexity is above a certain level, whereas in situations 
with lower complexity the urgency to make a decision is likely to decline. Hence 
a situation with a complexity level above a certain limit might result in an 
increase in decision-making time compared to a low complexity situation.  
 
There are significant differences between the 15-second time constraint and the 
120-second time constraint in the high complexity condition. There is a 
continuous increase in decision-making time. It seem like the participants adapt 
their decision making time to the time restricted conditions and as the available 
time increases the participants spend more time considering their next action.  
 
There was also a significant effect of time constraint in the medium complexity 
condition.  There is a significantly higher time to decision in the 30-second time 
constraint in comparison with the 15-second time constraint and a significantly 
lower time to decision between the 30-second time constraint and the 120-
second time constraint.  These results looks like they are in line with the results 
in the high complexity condition since there is an overall increase in decision 
making time between each condition when looking at the mean as well as a 
substantial increase in decision making time from the 15 second time constraint 
to the 30 second time constraint. Even though the 120 second time constraint 
does not differ significantly from the 15 second time constraint there is still a 
difference of ~1.5 seconds when looking at the means which give more support 
to this hypothesis.  
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An alternative interpretation of the substantial increase in decision-making time 
between the 15-second constraint and the 30-second constraint is that the 
stimulus used for this combination of time constraint and traffic complexity 
deviates in some way from the other medium complexity stimulus. This would 
also explain why decision-making time decreases significantly between the 30-
second time constraint and the 120-second time constraint. However, It is not 
certain that an individual image could be determined as the cause of this effect. 
Hence, the images used as stimulus in each complexity and time constraint 
should be completely randomized. 
 
There are no differences in decision-making time between the different traffic 
complexities in the 15-second time constraint.  However, the pairwise 
comparison of the significant simple main effects in Table 10 shows that there 
are significant differences between the low complexity condition and the 
medium complexity condition as well as a significant difference between 
medium and high complexity. The overall trend indicates an increase in decision 
time as the complexity level increases with a large increase in the medium 
complexity condition followed by an almost as large decrease. This result gives 
additional support that one of the stimuli deviate from the rest in some way.  
 
Looking at these results, especially the increase in decision time as external time 
pressure and traffic complexity decreases it is fairly clear that people adapt to 
the situation at hand (i.e. making their decisions faster when external pressure is 
at the highest (high complexity and high time pressure)). This goes in line with 
the theories behind MART (Young & Stanton, 2002a; Young & Stanton, 2002b) 
stating that the allocation of attentional resources increase as MWL increases 
due to increased complexity or time pressure.  
 
What factors could serve as predictors of decision-making time? 
  Are there any cognitive abilities that can serve as predictors of 
decision-making time? 
 
The final regression analysis resulted in a model that can predict ~11% of the 
variance in decision-making time. This is not a perfect model, however, there are 
some interesting predictor variables in the model. The DBQ measures show that 
an increase in the DBQ violations score is associated with a ~0.5 second decrease 
in decision time whereas an increase in DBQ errors has an opposite effect. It is 
possible that drivers who score high on the violations part makes more reckless 
decisions whereas drivers with high error score might be more careful since they 
are more self-conscious about their proneness to errors and therefore try to 
avoid making errors.  
 
Age is also a significant predictor in the model, indicating that as age increases so 
does decision time. This is also supported by the SNCT correct variable as the 
symbol number correspondence task score usually declines with age.  
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The SNCT correct variable is showing a decrease in decision time as the score 
increases. This indicates that speed of processing has an impact on decision-
making time.  Since Dohmen et al (2010) suggested that the SNCT would be a 
good way of assessing cognitive ability; the individuals with a high score on this 
test would most likely have a higher cognitive ability. If cognitive ability is 
related to a decision making style as suggested by Dohmen et al. (2010) and 
Fredricks (2005) that involves substantial reasoning and weighing the utility of 
each available decision there should be an effect of education, age and the SNCT 
on the decision time.  
 
In line with the decision-making theories age seem to have an effect on decision-
making time as an increase in age cause an increase in decision-making time. 
There is also the possibility that age in this case indicates some sort of cognitive 
or visual decline, which in turn causes an increase in decision-making time. It is 
also interesting to see that educational level seems to have an effect on decision-
making time, indicating that a higher education leads to longer decision-making 
times. Assuming that higher education equals higher IQ, this finding is in direct 
line with what Fredricks (2005) said about intelligence being related to decision-
making.  
 
It is also interesting to see that as the available time increased, the decision-
making time increased, which also supports the results from the factorial ANOVA 
indicating an increase in decision-making time as the time constraint decreased.  
These results are also supported by the MART theory (Young & Stanton, 2002a) 
as it states that attentional resources most likely will increase as to facilitate the 
increased workload in a complex time restricted situation. The theory then 
states that as workload decreases so will the attentional resources invested in 
the task, hence leading to increased decision times. The same holds for traffic 
complexity, as the traffic complexity decreases the decision-making time 
increases, also in line with the results from the factorial ANOVA.  
6.2  Methodology 
The method of data gathering used for this study made it very easy to reach a lot 
of people and recruit participants. However, there is always room for concern 
when conducting research outside a controlled setting. For instance, there is no 
way of knowing if some people made the test whilst attending a class or 
watching TV. There is also the problem of latency. There is no simple way of 
finding out whether participants used Safari, Chrome, Firefox or Opera as their 
browser. Different browsers might have different ways of calculating system 
time; hence, there is a possibility that there are discrepancies in time between 
participants using different browsers. There is also the problem with the 
computing power of the participants’ computers. Even though the test is 
designed to perform well on ordinary computers there might be some 
participants using out-dated hardware, which might have an effect on the overall 
test performance. 
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 Another thing that might affect performance on the tasks might be the 
participants internet connection as a slow connection makes the download of the 
images in the information preferences test load slowly, hence, giving rise to “lag” 
in the test, thus producing longer decision times than necessary. 
 
Any issues with the instructions and descriptions in the test were hopefully 
avoided by doing the pilot test for feedback before the actual testing phase but it 
would be unwise to assume that every participant understood the instructions 
fully as there might be varying English skills as well as some terminology issues.  
 
It would be desirable to do this test in a more controlled setting where it is 
possible to control for variance in computing power, browser usage and internet 
connection as well as making sure that all participants understand the 
instructions be able to provide help when they have problems understanding. 
Even though that would be desirable it would not be feasible as the overall 
purpose of doing a web based test was to be able to reach as many people as 
possible to make sure a demographically representative sample was collected, 
doing this the old fashioned way would result in large costs and the use of 
resources that would serve a better purpose elsewhere.  
6.3  Future research 
The results clearly indicate that this test is able to discern differences in 
decision-making time in different traffic conditions and in different time 
constraints. It would therefore be recommended to collect more data to get a 
more representative sample of a larger population before proceeding to 
additional analyses. Further possible analyses should include the following;  
  What was the first decision 
  Are the decisions drivers make different depending on the situation 
  Are the drivers decisions different depending on time pressure 
  What other factors are involved in the decision 
 
Furthermore it would be interesting to move this concept in to a driving 
simulator and try to assess what information people want in certain situation as 
well as how that information could be conveyed in different situations 
depending on the individual preferences of the driver. 
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7  Final conclusions 
Results from the factorial ANOVA clearly indicate that the experimental 
manipulations in this experiment were able to affect decision-making time, 
which supports the notion that this method is a promising way of exploring some 
aspects of highly automated driving.  
 
The results also show that there are a number of factors that influence decision-
making time apart from the experimental manipulations. Education is able to 
predict a significant portion of variance in the decision-making speed, which has 
good support in the literature. Driver attitudes and introspectiveness are also 
able to predict a significant portion of the variance, where “impulsivity”, as 
measured by the DBQ violations factor shows a decrease in decision-making time 
whereas the error proneness as measured by the DBQ errors shows an increased 
decision time as the score increases.  
 
The symbol number correspondence task was also a significant predictor of 
decision-making time, this is not unexpected as speed of processing and the time 
it takes to assess a situation should go hand in hand. However, cognitive ability 
should be taken in to consideration when designing the automated vehicle as to 
fulfil the needs of both drivers with higher, and lower cognitive capabilities. 
 
As decision-making time increases with aging, it should be considered when 
designing automated vehicles as a way of adapting the automation to the needs 
of the older drivers i.e. In terms of increased time before transfer of control 
initiates as to facilitate the increased time it would take to assess the situation at 
hand.  
 
The findings in this study could be a good foundation for designing the in-vehicle 
environment in a way that makes the automation adapt to both the needs of the 
driver and the external requirements. 
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9  Appendix 1: Pre-test information and consent 
 
Welcome to this study. This test is intended to measure your cognitive abilities in 
relation to your needs and the decisions you make in different driving contexts. The 
study is divided into different parts. You will be presented with two short 
questionnaires, cognitive tests, and visual scenarios of different traffic situations. The 
tasks are simple, and you will receive instructions throughout the whole test. Please, 
it's important that you try to perform as well as possible. The test takes no more than 
20 minutes. Thank you for your participation! 
By moving on to the test you accept that the data you provide can be used for 
scientific work and publications. The data will be presented at an aggregated level, 
such that it is impossible to identify which answers you have given. We guarantee that 
your data are treated with utmost care with respect to anonymity and personal 
integrity 
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